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Abstract
This study explains the emergence of the Sicilian mafia in the XIX century
as the product of the interaction between natural resource abundance and weak
institutions. We advance the hypothesis that the mafia emerged after the col-
lapse of the Bourbon Kingdom in a context characterized by a severe lack of state
property-right enforcement in response to the rising demand for the protection
of sulfur - Sicily’s most valuable export commodity - whose demand in the in-
ternational markets was soaring at the time. We test this hypothesis combining
data on the early presence of the mafia and on the distribution of sulfur reserves
across Sicilian municipalities and find evidence of a positive and significant ef-
fect of sulphur availability on mafia’s diffusion. These results remain unchanged
when including department fixed-effects and various geographical and historical
controls, when controlling for spatial correlation, and when comparing pairs of
neighboring municipalities with and without sulfur.
Keywords: Natural Resource Curse, Weak Institutions, Mafia-type Organiza-
tions
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1 Introduction
A large literature in economics and political science has investigated the effect of nat-
ural resources on political and economic development (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001;
Mehlum et al., 2006a,b; Haber and Menaldo, 2011). These studies have delivered
rather mixed results, and a general consensus has not emerged on whether, ultimately,
resource abundance should be viewed as a “blessing” or as a “curse”.1 But which
factors explain why the discovery of valuable resources leads to desirable outcomes in
some countries (e.g. Norway, Australia) and deleterious ones in others (e.g. Nigeria,
Zimbabwe)? The quality of pre-existing political and legal institutions is arguably im-
portant: when institutions are dysfunctional, conflict over access to resource rents is
likely to escalate, giving rise to increased corruption, rent-seeking, and even violence
(Skaperdas, 2002; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002). Similarly, the literature on organized
crime (Gambetta, 1993; Konrad and Skaperdas, 2012) has argued that the combina-
tion of weak institutions and resource abundance can be conducive to the emergence of
mafia-type organizations which can have profound and long-lasting effect on a country’s
economic prospects.
The profound socio-economic consequences of organized crime has been a subject of
growing interest among academics and policy-makers alike (Jennings, 1984; Fiorentini
and Peltzman, 1997; Skaperdas, 2001). Research on the topic has focused, in particular,
on the study of mafia-type organizations operating in various parts of the world.2 While
these contributions have expanded our knowledge of the nature and structure of such
organizations, their economic origins remain largely unexplored.
Our paper attempts to fill this gap advancing the hypothesis that mafias - which fol-
lowing Gambetta (1993) we conceptualize as providers of private protection - emerge to
protect valuable natural resources when public law-enforcement institutions are weak
or absent. While this argument is applicable to a broad range of examples, our empir-
ical analysis focuses on the particular case of the Sicilian mafia, the oldest and most
notorious example of this sort of organizations which dates back to the XIX century
and which has had a considerable and long-lasting effect on Sicily’s socio-economic
development.3 More specifically, we argue that the Sicilian mafia emerged after the
1See Frankel (2010) for a comprehensive survey on the topic.
2Relevant contributions on mafia-type organizations by sociologists include Gambetta’s seminal
work on the Sicilian mafia (1993), Varese’s studies of the Russian mafia (2005), and of the Japanese
Yacuza. Recent contributions by economists have looked the economic impact of the Sicilian mafia
(Pinotti, 2011) and the workings of criminal networks in the context of the American mafia (Mas-
trobuoni and Patacchini, 2011).
3Lupo (1993) and Dickie (2004) provide an excellent account of the history of the Sicilian mafia
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demise of feudalism and the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom in a context charac-
terized by a severe lack of state property-right enforcement in response to the rising
demand for the protection of sulfur - one of Sicily’s most valuable export commodity
- whose demand in the international markets was soaring at the time. Such positive
shock to the value of sulfur protection favored Mafia’s emergence in areas endowed
with sulfur reserves, naturally more prone to its production and commercialization.
To test this hypothesis we employ a comprehensive dataset which combines various
measures of early mafia’s diffusion across Sicilian municipalities with detailed informa-
tion on natural resource endowments and a range of other geographical characteristics.
Our identification strategy exploits exogenous differences in the geographic distribution
of sulfur reserves, which exposed ex-ante similar Sicilian municipalities to an asymmet-
ric shock to the value of protection, which lasted for most of the XIX century.
While documenting the magnitude of the shock and defending the exogeneity of its
distribution is relatively straightforward, establishing that municipalities that experi-
enced such a shock were ex-ante similar to those that did not is a more demanding task.
One crucial difficulty lies in excluding that differences in the availability of natural re-
sources are correlated to differences in other dimensions (e.g. institutional quality),
which may affect mafia’s emergence through other channels. To address this concern,
we pursue several strategies. First, we document that differences in sulfur reserves
are not correlated with population growth rates in previous centuries. Since in the
context of a Malthusian regime population represents a good indicator of the degree
of economic development, this is indicative of the fact that sulfur played no special
economic role prior to the XIX century. Second, in our econometric analysis we con-
trol for a wide range of observables that are likely to be correlated with institutional
quality, economic activity and geographic and demographic differences. Third, in all
our specifications we include area fixed effects, which allows us to identify our main
effect from variations in sulfur endowment within small areas, which are plausibly ho-
mogeneous along several non-observable dimensions. Finally, following Acemoglu et
al. (2012), we perform additional tests of our hypothesis based on the comparison of
pairs of neighboring municipalities with different sulfur endowment. Furthermore, to
account for possible spatial correlation in mafia’s emergence, we replicate our analysis
using spatial regression methods.4
and of its expansion to other regions of Italy and to the United States.
4Acemoglu et al. (2012) employ this strategy to estimate the effect of gold-mines-related slavery in
Colombia. One advantage of our application is that we do not have to worry about the endogeneity
of slavery, since we are directly interested in the effect of natural resources.
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Our empirical findings provide strong support for our main hypothesis. In partic-
ular, we find that sulfur availability has a positive large and significant effect on early
incidence of mafia activities. Our findings are robust to the use of different measures
of early mafia incidence, to the introduction of a number of geographical and socio-
economic controls, and to the use of the complementary approaches discussed above.
We also discuss and test alternative explanations of the emergence of the Sicilian mafia
proposed in the literature - such as the key role played by citrus production - which,
however, do not appear to find support in the data. Although the focus of our analysis
is on the emergence of the mafia, in the last part of the paper we also document the
existence of a strong correlation between historical and current presence of the mafia,
and discuss the possibility of using sulfur availability as an instrument for the latter.
Although specific to the case of the Sicilian mafia, we believe that our findings can
be helpful to inform our understanding of the rise of mafia-type organizations in various
different parts of the world, where similar economic and institutional conditions may
have occurred.5”
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our the-
oretical framework and relates our work to the literature on mafia-type organizations
and resource curse. In section 3 we discuss the socio-economic and political conditions
of XIX century Sicily that favored the emergence of the mafia, with particular regard
for the collapse of the Bourbon regime and the upsurge in sulfur’s value. In section 4
we present the data used in the empirical analysis, while in section 5 we describe our
empirical strategy and discuss our findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 On mafia and resource curse
Various theoretical approaches have been proposed in the literature to study the struc-
ture and functioning of mafia-type organizations (see Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1997
and Anderson and Bandiera, 2005 among others). It is hence important to immedi-
ately clarify what is the working definition of mafia we refer to. Following Gambetta’s
seminal contribution (1993), we conceptualize the mafia as an industry for private pro-
tection; in this framework the equilibrium level of mafia’s activity is determined by
the interaction between demand and supply of protection services by private providers
since public provision is lacking or greatly ineffective.
5It is the case, for example, of Yakuza in Japan, the Triad in Hong Kong and the Russian mafia.
Indeed, Yakuza had its origins after the demise of the feudal system in Japan, while the Russian mafia
after the dissolution of the USSR.
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Our research relates to the vast literature on the socio-political impact of natural
resources. This literature has discussed various mechanisms through which resource
abundance may ultimately be regarded as a “curse”: vast resources may fuel violence,
theft and looting (Skaperdas, 2002), they may be used to finance rebel groups, warlords
or civil wars (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002), or may favor the emergence of criminal
organizations aiming to extract part of the wealth derived from their exploitation.
Although some evidence suggests that resource-rich countries display worse economic
performance than resource-poor ones (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001), no unanimous
consensus on this matter has emerged (see for example Haber and Menaldo, 2011).
In fact, as some observers have pointed out, whether natural resources may result in
a “curse” or a “blessing” may crucially depend on a country’s institutional quality
(Mehlum et al., 2006a,b).6 In the presence of weak institutions, our argument goes,
natural resources are particularly vulnerable to predatory attacks; in this context, the
(illegal) use of violence provides mafia-type criminal organizations with a competitive
advantage in the supply of protection and extortion (Gambetta, 1993; Konrad and
Skaperdas, 2012), resulting in the capacity to extract a substantial portion of natural-
resource-based rents.
This research integrates two previous econometric studies that have looked at the
historical emergence of the Sicilian mafia. The first one, by Bandiera (2003), uses a
common agency model to formalize the idea that the mafia should have been historically
more active in towns were land was more fragmented,7 and finds support for this
hypothesis using qualitative data from the 1885 parliamentary survey (Damiani, 1885)
on 70 districts (mandamenti) in western Sicily. 8 The second one, by Pazzona (2010),
expands Bandiera’s sample to 160 observations, documenting that the mafia was more
likely to emerge where the competition by new social actors was harsher, particularly
in areas where land value was higher and land holdings larger, at the opposite of what
Bandiera (2003) finds. We improve upon these contributions by expanding the scope
of the analysis to a much larger and more detailed set of geographical units covering
the entire island; this allows us to investigate the large differences in the incidence of
6Institutional quality may, in turn, depends on features as diverse as geographic isolation, ethnic
divisions, or state collapse (Skaperdas, 2011).
7The argument is based on the idea that the purchase of protection from a single landowner imposes
a negative externality on the other ones (since it deflects thieves on their properties), and that, hence,
landlords will be competing with each other to acquire protection and to exclude others from it. By
increasing the number of competing landlords, land fragmentation should increase mafia’s potential
profits.
8We present and discuss in detail in the data section the parliamentary survey employed by
Bandiera (2003) and the administrative jurisdictions in XIX century Sicily.
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the mafia across Sicilian areas, which is considered one of the most puzzling question
about the history of the Sicilian mafia.9
Following the first version of this paper, two independent contributions have ex-
plored alternative explanations for the mergence of the Sicilian mafia. While Dimico
et al. (2012) propose an argument similar to ours but centered around the histori-
cal role of citrus fruits, Del Monte and Pennacchio (2012) investigate the relationship
between organized crime and brigandage. In our empirical section we test the robust-
ness of our results to these alternative explanations and discuss some important data
and methodological issues which, in our view, raise concern over the solidity of these
studies’ respective findings.
More in general, the results of this research complement the literature on the emer-
gence of persistent social institutions as the consequence of what can be viewed as
‘historical accident’ (Acemoglu et al. (2001)), which in the context our our study,
would be represented by the sudden rise in international demand for Sicilian sulfur.
Although geographical characteristics per se are not the focus of our study, the findings
we present can also be interpreted in the context of the debate on the long-term impact
of geography on socio-economic development. Previous research has documented that
the environment can influence economic performance directly, through its effect on
health and agricultural productivity (Landes (1998); Sachs and Malaney (2002)), and
indirectly, by setting the conditions in which social norms and political institutions have
formed (Sokoloff and Engerman (2000); Easterly and Levine (2003); Durante (2009);
Nunn and Puga (2012) and Michalopoulos et al. (2010)) or by defining environmen-
tal constraints to population growth (Galor and Weil (2000)). The evidence presented
here suggests that, under given economic circumstances, geographic characteristics may
have contributed to the emergence of particular forms of social organizations (crimi-
nal ones in this case), which have persisted over time and continue to have relevant
socio-economic effects.
3 Historical background
XIX century Sicily presented the two conditions that, according to the “resource curse”
argument discussed above, are conducive to mafia’s emergence: poor quality of law-
enforcement institutions and soaring value of domestic natural resources. In what
follows we discuss some aspects of the XIX century Sicily political and socio-economic
9This aspect has been discussed by historians, sociologists and economists alike. Some examples
include Lupo (1993); Gambetta (1993) and Sylos Labini (2003).
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context that are relevant to our analysis, with particular regard to the main sources
of institutional weakness, and the impact of growing international demand for Sicily’s
high-value mining and agricultural production.
3.1 Institutional weakness and economic development
Two major political transformations characterized the history of Sicily during the XIX
century: the demise of feudalism in 1812, and the collapse of the Bourbon’s domination
in 1861. Both these events contributed to the disruption of Sicilian law enforcement
institutions and the deterioration of property-rights security.
Feudal barons had long been struggling with the monarchy, which imposed on them
a heavy fiscal burden, and this struggle intensified when, in 1806, in an attempt to
escape from the French, the Bourbons moved from Naples to Palermo, Sicily’s capital.
At the beginning of the XIX century most of Sicilian municipalities were under barons’
direct jurisdiction; however, most feudal lords did not reside in their lands but in
Palermo, the center of the island’s political, economic and social life.10 Their lands,
together with their feudal rights, were generally rented out to local administrators
(gabelloti), who were in charge of managing the landholding’s productive activities and
who invested their own capital in it. The abolition of feudalism represented a profound
institutional change, which officially transferred all feudal jurisdictions to the State.
Yet, while barons’ control over their lands had been weakened, limits to the power of
the monarch had also been imposed by the establishment of a parliamentary system
that assigned to the Parliament - largely dominated by the barons - extensive powers of
control over the King’s acts (Candeloro, 1956). The power struggle between landlords
and the Bourbons continued until 1861, when the kingdom collapsed and its territories
were annexed to the newly formed Italian State. This institutional struggle resulted in
extremely low levels of law enforcement, a situation which did not improve under the
unified State.
The feudal economy was primarily agrarian, based on extensive cultivations (mainly
cereals) and characterized by very low productivity and peasants’s extreme poverty.
The abolition of feudalism had little de facto impact on land distribution and did not
result in increased productivity (Blok, 1966, 1969). The most valuable productions
were particularly exposed to predatory attacks from local bandits (briganti), and the
10The port of Palermo was by far the more trafficked in the Island. In 1838, on a total of 480 Sicilian
merchant vessels that left for foreign ports, 240 were from Palermo, while only 65 from Messina, the
second port in order of importance (Petino, 1958).
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lack of law enforcement by the State triggered the demand for private forms of protec-
tion. Where this demand emerged, the supply of individuals specialized in the use of
violence was abundant, and information about potential customers as well as suppliers’
reputation flew quickly. In the countryside, gabelloti were surrounded by a number of
guards, former soldiers and former convicts, all trained in the use of violence, who,
formerly employed by feudal lords, were now looking for new job opportunities. Local
networks of such individuals quickly emerged: extremely well informed about the local
context - about potential victims of violent predation and potential perpetrators alike
- they were in the position to establish a credible reputation as effective protectors.
In the words of Franchetti (1876), this process led to a “democratization of violence”.
As the violent threats used to protect their “clients” could also be used to intimidate
them, early mafiosi were in a position to create their own demand; as a consequence,
the distinction between supply of protection and threat of extortion was generally un-
clear. Indeed, various forms of agreements linked briganti and mafiosi, as the latter
used the threat of the former to justify the services they offered.11
3.2 Sulfur
The case of the sulfur industry represents one of the clearest examples of how, in the
absence of effective public law-enforcement institutions, a florid market for private pro-
tection emerged. Sulfur mines were rented out and, not unusually, the right to exploit
them had to be defended from violent attacks. Furthermore, once extracted, sulfur
minerals - largely produced for export purposes - had to be transported to Palermo or
other ports, so cargoes’ safety along the way had to be ensured as well. Starting in
the first decades of the XIX century, international demand for sulfur soared, as this
represented a fundamental intermediary input for industrial and chemical productions,
which were quickly expanding both in Britain and France.12 For all of the XIX century
and during the first decade of the XX century, Sicily represented the world’s largest
11Moreover, private protection exerts negative externalities on those who are not protected, since it
deflects the threats toward them, as in Bandiera (2003). This is another way in which supply creates
its own demand.
12In 1855 over 70% of Sicilian sulfur was exported to France and Great Britain (Squarzina, 1963).
Sulfur is the base of oil of vitriol, and of almost all the acids and alkalis which are extensively used
in various manufacturing processes. It is also required for the manufacture of gunpowder as well as
for the production of various medicines (Rawson, 1840). Even if industrial substitutes for sulfur have
been discovered and developed since the late 1840s, the use of sulfur gained again momentum because
of its use in grape cultivation as a fungicide. Still in 1940 sulfur accounted for 20% of Sicily’s total
export value (Pescosolido, 2010).
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sulfur producer, accounting for up to 83% of world sulfur production in 1893.13
The increase in international demand for sulfur determined an increase in the value
of its protection favoring mafia’s emergence. To identify this effect, our empirical
analysis exploits exogenous variations in the availability of sulfur across Sicilian mu-
nicipalities. It is worth to stress that Sicilian sulfur was mainly superficial (Squarzina,
1963; Cancila, 1995) and hence no considerable investments were required to find and
extract it, so the information on the presence of sulfur mines proxies very well the
presence of sulfur itself. Key to our identification strategy is the assumption that the
presence of sulfur reserves was unimportant for local economic activity prior to the
XIX century. Available evidence on Sicily’s sulfur export is consistent with this view:
as shown in figure 1 Sicilian sulfur exports, virtually negligible at the beginning of the
XIX century, exceeded 500 thousands tons by the beginning of the XX, accounting
for about 6% of Sicilian GDP. Export growth was especially marked during the years
comprised between the 1830s and the 1850s when it reached an astonishing 9% annual
rate.14 All these factors contributed to increase sulfur producers’ demand for protection
both around the mines and along the routes connecting these to the main ports.
Not surprisingly, the Brotherhood of Favara, the first documented mafia-type crim-
inal organization, was discovered in 1883 in the heart of sulfur-producing Sicily (see
Dickie, 2004). The discovery of this organization led to the arrest of more than 200
affiliated (on a total of more than 500 arrested), 107 of whom were convicted in the
following trial. Of these 107, 72 were workers, at different layers, of the sulfur industry,
coming from two rival factions, which found in the Brotherhood a way to achieve power
in the market of protection in the context of sulfur extraction.
It is important to mention that the export of Sicilian sulfur rapidly declined over the
first part of the XX century; this was mainly due to the development of new extraction
technologies which made it cheaper to exploit previously untapped deep reserves in
other parts of the world, thus reducing the comparative advantage of Sicilian superficial
sulfur mines.
13Sicilian sulfur production and export almost coincided since, throughout the XIX century, virtually
no sulfur-intensive industries were active in the region, letting aside its use in grape cultivation.
14We focus on export volumes because, around the 1830s, prices experienced considerable fluctua-
tions due to the establishment and the subsequent dissolution of a monopoly (they remained relatively
stable afterwards).
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Figure 1: Export of Sicilian sulfur
Note: Thousands of tons of sulfur exported from Sicily. Sources: Squarzina (1963)
and Cancila (1995).
3.3 Citrus fruits
Some historians and commentators have advanced the hypothesis that the development
of the citrus industry - which also took place in the XIX century - also played an
important role in favoring the emergence of the Sicilian mafia, especially in the area
around Palermo. As Dickie (2004) points out: “In 1834, over 400,000 cases of lemons
were exported. By 1850, it was 750,000. In the mid-1880s an astonishing 2.5 million
cases of Italian citrus fruit arrived in New York every year, most of them from Palermo”.
Indeed, the evolution of international demand for citrus fruits resembles that of sulfur,
although the time pattern for citrus is less clear than for sulfur and Sicily was never a
quasi-monopolist in the market for citrus fruits as it was in the sulfur market. Although
citrus fruits cultivations were especially concentrated in the areas areas around Palermo
and the surrounding Conca d’Oro where early mafia’s presence was considerable, as
reported in the 1885 parliamentary enquiry (Damiani, 1885) and depicted in figure 2,
the cultivation of citrus was similarly widespread in the eastern part of Sicily, where the
mafia remained virtually absent until the second part of the XX century. One possibly
insightful way to empirically investigate this rather puzzling issue is to look at the
distribution of the inputs employed in citrus cultivation: land and water. While Sicily’s
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climatic conditions and soil composition are generally favorable to the cultivation of
citrus fruits - particularly in coastal areas - such cultivation requires abundant and
regular availability of water which, instead, tends to vary substantially across different
areas of Sicily. Indeed, underground water basins tend to be scarcer in the Western
part of Sicily, so that in this areas the provision of water to cultivated areas crucially
depends on superficial water channels, which have historically been easily controllable
by the mafia. As a result, the extortion power over citrus producers, and hence the
possibility to appropriate rents from citrus cultivation, could be expected to be higher
in Western than in Eastern Sicily. Indeed, most water guards in the second half of
the XIX century were related to the mafia and not surprisingly, the first known mafia-
related murder was that of a water guard, who was killed in 1874 in the context of the
fight between different mafia families over water control (Cutrera, 1900).15
Figure 2: Citrus cultivation
Note: Share of land cultivated with citrus fruits over total cultivated land, by
quintiles of the distribution. Darker shades represent higher shares. Missing values
are represented in white. Source: Damiani (1885)
15All the other competing explanations of mafia activity (including, among others, land fragmenta-
tion, ruggedness and population density) will be discussed in the next section.
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4 Data
To test the main predictions of our theoretical argument, we look at differences across
Sicilian municipalities. To do so, we use historical data on the presence of the mafia
and on the availability of sulphur in the late XIX century, as well as data on a wide
range of geographical and historical controls. In what follows we describe the data
sources and discuss how the variables used in the empirical analysis are constructed.
4.1 Mafia
Our primary source of data on the early diffusion of the mafia in Sicily is represented
by the work of Cutrera (1900). Former law-enforcement official and one of the major
experts of the phenomenon of the time, Cutrera collected detailed information on the
intensity of the activity of the mafia in 285 Sicilian municipalities in the last decades
of the XIX century. In particular, for each municipality, Cutrera assessed the intensity
of mafia activity on a four-point scale ranging from none, to low, intermediate and
high. Cutrera’s data have been extensively used in previous historical and sociological
studies on the Sicilian mafia, including Gambetta’s seminal contribution (1993). An
alternative source of information on the early incidence of mafia activity is represented
by the Damiani-Jacini parliamentary enquiry (Damiani, 1885).16 This was part of a
nation-wide inquiry conducted between 1881 and 1885 with the primary aim of col-
lecting information on the conditions of the peasantry under the newly unified state.17
In addition to extensive municipal-level information on a variety of agriculture-related
variables, the Damiani-Jacini inquiry contains information on the intensity of mafia ac-
tivity in 158 Sicilian districts (mandamenti).18 This information was collected through
a questionnaire transmitted to lower court magistrates (pretori) who were asked to
assess the intensity of the activity of the mafia in their district of jurisdiction on a
16An additional source is the Borsani-Bonfadini parliamentary enquiry on the conditions of Sicily
conducted between 1874 and 1876. However, this inquiry only reports the 43 municipalities (out of
357) in which the mafia appears to be more widespread. Given its limited scope, we do not use these
data in our empirical analysis.
17The inquiry started in 1881 and was completed at the end of 1884. The main questionnaire on the
conditions of the agrarian class was transmitted to all Sicilian mayors on May 20th 1883. A complete
version of the questionnaire can be found at page V, volume XIII, tome II, fascicle IV of the official
inquiry report.
18Post-unification Sicily was characterized by four levels of administrative division: the largest
was the province, followed by the department (circondario), the district (mandamento), and the
municipality (comune). Overall, Sicily was divided into 7 provinces (Caltanissetta, Catania, Girgenti,
Messina, Noto, Palermo, Trapani), 24 departments, 179 districts and 357 municipalities.
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four-point scale analogous to that used by Cutrera.19
We believe that Cutrera’s data are preferable to Damiani-Jacini’s for several rea-
sons. First, unlike Damiani-Jacini’s, Cutrera’s data are available at the municipal level
and cover the large majority of Sicilian municipalities (about 80%), allowing for a more
extensive and finer empirical assessment of the relationship between sulfur availability
and early mafia activity. One important drawback of the Damiani-Jacini’s data is that
the reported level of mafia activity is solely based on the subjective assessment of re-
spondents and is therefore susceptible to differences in the evaluation criteria adopted
by local officials. Actual unawareness, fear of retaliation or contiguity with the mafia
would, for example, bias respondents towards underreporting the level of activity of
the mafia in their jurisdiction, introducing measurement error in the measure. As dis-
cussed in Pazzona (2010), the problem would be even more severe if such factors were
themselves correlated with actual mafia activity, (or to its determinants). Cutrera’s
measure is likely to be less vulnerable to this concern. On the one hand, there is no
reason to believe Cutrera would employ different evaluation criteria when assessing the
level of activity of the mafia in different municipalities. On the other hand, given his
position of outside observer, it is reasonable to think that Cutrera’s assessment of mafia
activity would be relatively unresponsive to the specific incentives faced by local offi-
cials (and, indirectly, to the actual strength of mafiaactivity). We therefore believe that
the use of Cutrera’s measure would mitigate the empirical problems discussed above,
although we do not claim that it eliminates them. Athough our empirical analysis will
primarily rely on Cutrera’s data, we will also test the robustness of our findings using
the Damiani-Jacini’s district-level data. In what follows, we indicate with maf c and
maf d, the index of mafia intensity based respectively on Cutrera and Damiani-Jacini.
The geographical distribution of the Sicilian mafia in the late XIX century, based
respectively on Cutrera’s and Damiani-Jacini’s data, is depicted in Figure 4.1. Relative
to Damiani-Jacini’s, Cutreras’ data indicate that the mafia was more present in the
Western part of the island, particularly in the areas around Palermo and Agrigento.
This pattern, largely consistent with numerous reports from historians and early mafia
19The jurisdiction of low court magistrates coincided with the district; hence their assessment of
the activity of the mafia reported in the Damiani-Jacini inquiry has to be understood as referring to
the entire district area, and not just to one or more municipalities within the district. This aspect has
generated some confusion among users of the Damiani-Jacini’s data (Bandiera, 2003; Pazzona, 2010;
Dimico et al., 2012), who appear to have erroneously interpreted the information on the activity of
the mafia as referring to the municipal rather than the district level. This confusion can probably be
attributed to the presence, in most districts, of municipalities with the same name as the district they
are part of (e.g. municipality of Messina in the district of Messina, municipality of Girgenti in the
district of Girgenti, etc.).
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experts (see Lupo, 1993 and Sylos Labini, 2003 among others), is further reassuring on
the accuracy of Cutrera’s data.20
Figure 3: Geographic distribution of the Sicilian mafia in the late XIX century
(a) Cutrera (b) Damiani-Jacini
The figure reports the assessment of the intensity of mafia activity according to Cutrera
(left) and Damiani-Jacini (right), with darker colors indicating more intense mafia’s activity
(missing values are reported in white). Cutrera’s data are at the municipality level while
Damiani-Jacini’s are at the district level. Missing values correspond to cases for which it
was not possible to match historical municipalities (or districts) to current ones, e.g. for
municipalities created in the XX century.
4.2 Sulfur and other geographical and historical controls
With regard to the presence of sulfur, comprehensive municipal data are available
from Squarzina (1963). These include information on the number of sulfur mines in
each Sicilian municipality in 1886 - that is, around the pick of Sicily’s sulfur export
boom. Since we are interested in gauging the original stock of sulphur available in each
municipality - hence prior to the intense depletion which took place throughout the
XIX century - we consider those mines that were still operating in 1886 as well as those
that were already exhausted by then. It is worth emphasizing, once again, that Sicilian
sulfur was generally superficial so that its extraction was relatively unchallenging and
did not require considerable investments; as a consequence, at the peak of Sicily’s
20A visual inspection of the two maps highlights incoherent patterns in Damiani-Jacini’s data, that
are at odds with a diffusive process as the mafia is likely to be. Take for example the northwestern
area around Palermo: Palermo and its surrounding coastal municipalities are all characterized by high
mafia activity, while most of the other neighboring southern municipalities are all coded as having
no mafia activity. Going further south, again many municipalities turn to be flagged as high mafia
ones. Conversely, Cutrera’s map shows a much smoother spatial pattern in terms of intensity of mafia
activity, suggesting a more careful and homogeneous assessment of the variable.
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sulfur export boom, virtually all major sulfur reserves on the island had been tapped
(Squarzina, 1963). In light of this fact, the presence of sulfur mines can be considered
a good proxy for the exogenous distribution of sulfur reserves, which is ultimately our
variable of interest. The distribution of sulfur mines in each municipality (labeled
sulfur henceforth), is summarized in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4: Geographic distribution of Sicilian sulfur mines (1886)
The figure reports the number of sulfur mines (both active and exhausted) recorded in
each Sicilian municipality in 1886 on a four-color scale: 0 (lighter gray), 1-10, 11-30,
more than 30 (darker gray).
In our empirical analysis we control for a range of other geographical and historical
variables at the municipal level. We focus, in particular, on factors that may have
influenced the demand and supply of protection and, at the same time, may be cor-
related with the presence of sulfur, in order to test that sulphur availability has an
independent effect on the emergence of the mafia and is not merely proxying for other
characteristics.
To account for difference in topography, we control for terrain ruggedness and el-
evation. As discussed by Nunn and Puga (2012), in addition to its obvious effect on
agricultural productivity and trade, rugged terrain - in the form of hills, caves and
cliffs - provides lookout posts and hiding places for individuals trying to escape. Ar-
guably, in the context of Sicily rugged areas provided outlaws with better protection
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from police forces. This view is consistent with accounts by various historians; for ex-
ample, when discussing the widespread presence of the mafia in the mountainous towns
of Gangi, Lupo (2004) emphasizes the importance of the town’s impervious location
which made it particularly difficult for law enforcement officers to establish control
over the surrounding area and apprehend criminals. To account for this aspect, we
include in our regressions a municipal measure of terrain ruggedness constructed from
the Global Land One-km Base Elevation Project (GLOBE), a global gridded digital
elevation data set covering the Earth’s surface at a 10-minute spatial resolution (ap-
proximately 1km).21 Relatedly, we also control for difference in elevation within a given
area, a variable which has been identified in the literature as imposing significant limi-
tations on both agriculture and breeding activities (Michalopoulos, 2011; Grigg, 1995;
Lupo, 1993). In particular, we use data on the maximum difference in altitude in a
given municipality available from the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
We are also interested in controlling for the suitability of local land for various types
of crops, as this is likely to have affected the demand for protection of agricultural
goods. In fact, while some low-value crops (i.e. cereals) were consumed locally, others
(e.g. citrus fruits, olive, sumac) were high-value export goods which demanded a degree
of protection similar to that of sulfur. To account for this aspect, we include in our
regressions measures of land suitability for the three most widespread crop categories
in XIX century Sicily: i) citrus fruits, ii) cereals, and iii) olives. These measures are
constructed using data on crop-specific agro-ecological suitability available from the
IIASA-FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones project (GAEZ).22 The GAEZ data are in
grid format, have a very high resolution (1’), and assign to each grid cell a value from
0 (totally unsuitable), to 100 (very suitable). To obtain suitability measures at the
municipality level we average the individual suitability score of all the cells in a given
municipality. We focus on crop suitability - determined in large part by exogenous soil
properties and climatic conditions - rather than on actual crop production to minimize
concerns of possible reverse effects of the presence of the mafia on the prevalence of
particular crops. Nevertheless, in the last part of our analysis, to test one of the
alternative hypothesis about the emergence of the mafia, we use information on the
proportion of land devoted to the cultivation of citrus fruits in each municipality,
21The GLOBE data set has superseded the GTOP30 which, before the introduction of GLOBE, was
considered the most accurate digital elevation data set and had been used, among others, by Nunn
and Puga (2012).
22More information on the FAO-GAEZ project can be found at http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at/. Data
from FAO-GAEZ have been used extensively by economists in recent years to investigate a variety of
topics. Examples include Nunn and Qian (2011), Michalopoulos (2011) and Durante (2009).
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available from the Damiani-Jacini’s inquiry. Given the importance of irrigation for
several of the crops mentioned above, and in light of the accounts of various observers
about the crucial role played by the mafia in controlling water supply, we also control for
the relative scarcity of water in a given area using data on the presence of underground
water basins available from the Sicilian Waters Observatory.
Another set of controls is intended to capture factors such as access to major ways
of communication and proximity to the main ports, which were arguably important
determinants of the value of protection. The first variable, labeled as postal roads,
indicates whether, at the beginning of the XIX century, a municipality had direct access
to one of the postal roads which connected Sicily’s largest towns. The data are derived
from the digitalization and geo-referentiation of a detailed historical map of Sicily in
late XVIII century (Cary, 1799), hence prior to the steady rise in sulfur’s international
demand. Other variables include the distance of a municipality’s centroid from the
closest non-seasonal river (river distance), and distance from the closest commercial
port (port distance).23
We also control for a set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics which
could potentially be related to both sulphur availability and mafia presence. In par-
ticular, to account for the fact that crime incidence might be higher in more densely
populated areas (Glaeser et al., 1996; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999; Buonanno et al.,
2012) we control for a measure of population density (density) based on data on mu-
nicipal population from the 1861 census.24 Relatedly, to control for possible differences
between rural and urban areas, we also define a dummy variable, urban, indicating
whether a municipality is located at a distance of 10Km or less from one of Sicily’s
then five largest cities.25
Finally, we also control for the degree of land fragmentation, a factor which previous
contributions have related to the development of a florid market for private protection
and the consequent emergence of the mafia (Bandiera, 2003). Information on the degree
of land fragmentation in each municipality is available from one of the questionnaires
23Sicily’s main commercial ports were: Mazara del Vallo, Porto Empedocle, Trapani, Siracusa,
Catania, Palermo and Messina.
24By 1861 Sicily’s total population amounted to 2.1 million, accounting for more than 10% of
Italy’s population. Population density was more than 81 inhabitants per squared kilometer, roughly
comparable to the current density of Spain. Since then, the increase in population has been rather
homogeneous across Sicilian municipalities, resulting in a correlation between population in 2001 and
in 1861of of 0.95. Palermo, the capital, was Sicily’s largest and denser city, with a population of
185,000 inhabitants and a density of 1,000 inhabitants per squared kilometer, comparable to that of
current mid-size Italian cities.
25These include: Palermo, Catania, Trapani, Messina and Girgenti.
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of the Damiani-Jacini’s inquiry in which mayors where asked to report whether land
in their municipality was prevalently composed by small, medium or large landhold-
ings. In particular, we define a dummy variable, fragmentation, taking value one for
municipality where small and medium landholdings were prevalent, and zero in those
in which large landholding still existed. Due to the rather low response rate to this
question, data on fragmentation are available for only 237 out of the 285 municipalities
in our sample.
The availability of data at the municipal level allow us to include in all our regression
department specific fixed effects which capture the political and historical background
common to municipalities in the same department. In particular, since in the period
under examination the Sicilian administrative, judicial and law-enforcement systems
were organized at department level, the inclusion of 24 department fixed effects allow
us to estimate the effect of sulphur on mafia by comparing municipalities characterized
by a fairly homogenous level of institutional quality.
5 Empirical Analysis
This section presents the empirical assessment of how geographical variations in sulfur
endowment contributed to the emergence of the Sicilian mafia. As discussed above,
over the XIX century Sicily experienced the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom and a
generalized situation of weak law enforcement. Over the same century, international
demand for sulfur soared and most of the world supply came from Sicily. Municipalities
with sulfur reserves thus experienced a boom in the value of their natural resources.26
We exploit the exogenous distribution of sulfur reserves to identify the effects of such
boom on mafia’s emergence. We document a resource curse, by which valuable natural
resources fostered protection demand and extortion opportunities, thus favoring the
emergence of organized crime.
5.1 Municipality-level estimates
Table 2 provides our first clear evidence of the importance of sulfur for mafia’s emer-
gence. It reports municipality-level OLS estimates of our preferred mafia measure
26As already shown in figure 1, sulfur export in Sicily grew at an impressive rate of 9% throughout
the period 1830 and 1860 and in that period Sicily served around 90% of the world sulfur demand.
sulfur export was negligible at the beginning of the XIX century, peaked at the end of that century
(reaching 540,000 tons in 1901) and sharply declined in the XX century (by 1976, it was only 85,000
tons).
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(maf c) on the number of sulfur mines (sulfur). The different columns gradually in-
crease the number of control variables.27 Column 1 shows that, in a univariate regres-
sion (including a constant, as in all regressions in all tables), the estimated coefficient
on sulfur, significant at the 1% level, is equal to 0.033, implying that a one standard
deviation increase in sulfur leads to an increase in maf c by more than one sixth of a
standard deviation.28 Column 2 adds department fixed effects. This is our first step
in tackling the issue of whether differences in sulfur endowment pick up differences in
other variables, which may matter for mafia’s emergence. Such fixed effects control for
any characteristic that was common within each department. The result shows that
even within each department, municipality-level variations in sulfur endowment were
positively and significantly associated to variations in early mafia’s presence (the point
estimate is 0.022 and it is significant at the 1% level).
To minimize the risk that within-department variations in sulfur endowment are
related to differences in other variables, which may themselves be related to mafia
activity, columns 3 to 7 progressively add municipality-level controls for differences
in agriculture, geography, transportation and communication, socio-demographic vari-
ables and land fragmentation (always including department fixed effects). No matter
which controls we include, sulfur remains highly significant and the magnitude of the
coefficient is barely affected, suggesting that our main result is not driven by any
omitted variable.29
The first group of additional control variables contains exogenous soil characteris-
tics, which are related to agricultural activity: column 3 includes soil suitability for
cultivation of citrus fruits, cereals and olives, as well as a dummy for water scarcity. It
is important to control for such factors because many scholars have argued that mafia’s
emergence was related to citrus cultivation (Lupo, 2004; Gambetta, 1993; Dickie, 2004;
Del Monte and Pennacchio, 2012; Dimico et al., 2012) and also to mafia’s possibility to
control scarce water resources and thus have high extortionary power towards agricul-
tural production (Sylos Labini, 2003). Both suitability for cereals and for citrus have a
significant effect, the former positive and the latter negative, but only the former effect
remains significant as additional controls are introduced. These results do not support
27Since maf c is an ordinal variable, we repeated the entire analysis using ordered probit, obtaining
analogous results, which are available upon request.
28Given the linearity implied by the measure of mafia activity, it takes 30 mines more to have an
increase in mafia activity from one level (not present, presence is low, intermediate, high) to the next.
29The coefficient on sulfur is only raised when we add land fragmentation to the controls. Yet,
notice that this reduces sample size from 282 to 237 municipalities since, as discussed in the previous
section, information on fragmentation are available only for 237 municipalities.
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the widely held idea that early mafia’s development was related to citrus cultivation.
Column 4 adds two geographic controls: average ruggedness and difference in elevation
(Nunn and Puga, 2012; Michalopoulos, 2011). Ruggedness is never significant, while
difference in elevation is strongly significant and positive. Column 5 adds the presence
of 1799 postal roads, as well as distance from the closest non-seasonal river and from
the closest commercial port. Mafia’s presence was significantly higher in municipalities
along old postal roads, whereas distances from rivers and ports are not significant. Col-
umn 6 further adds population density in 1861 and a dummy for urban municipalities.
Such variables are related to the level of economic activity, both legal and illegal (see,
e.g. Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999; Buonanno et al., 2012). In line with the literature,
we find that population density is positively and significantly related to mafia’s emer-
gence. Finally, column 7 adds land fragmentation, which according to Bandiera (2003)
should be relevant for mafia’s emergence, but we find no support for her thesis.
As an additional robustness check, we re-run our baseline regression substituting
the number of sulfur mines (sulfur) with a dummy (sulfur d) for the presence of at
least a mine in the municipality. Using sulfur d is important because we do not have
information on the quantity of sulfur extracted in each mine and we therefore put
ourselves in the worst case scenario, that is we do not exploit at all the information
on the intensive margin in the distribution of sulfur. Table 3 reproduces the same
specifications of Table 2, but it replaces sulfur d (the dummy for the presence of at
least a sulfur mine in a municipality) for sulfur. For the sake of space, we only report
the coefficient of sulfur d. Results show that, even if we neglect the information on the
intensive margin of sulfur extraction and only rely on the extensive margin, the presence
of sulfur is still significant to explain Mafia’s emergence. Yet, the slight decrease in
significance levels also suggests that the intensive margin was relevant as well.
While the above analysis suggests that omitted variables are not driving our re-
sults, as an additional check we control for possible spatial effects. There is no reason
to believe that mafia’s activity follows the administrative boundaries of municipali-
ties. Mafia lords may indeed offer protection and practice extortion in neighboring
municipalities, whose territory they control. They may also establish agreements with
other mafia lords, who control different territories, for instance to grant protection to
their clients’ goods transiting through them. Moreover, protection externalities may
foster mafia’s activity in a municipality just because the mafia is active in neighboring
municipalities. There may therefore be relevant spatial spillovers from a municipality
to its neighbors. Omitting to take them into account may reduce the efficiency of our
estimates and bias them.
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To address this issue, we estimate a spatial model by means of the generalized spatial
two stage least squares (GS2SLS) estimator of Kelejian and Prucha (1998). Results are
presented in table 4, which reproduces the same specification of column 6 of table 2.30
We employ both a non-standardized (columns 1 to 3) and a row-standardized (columns
4 to 6) contiguity matrix. We implement a spatial error model (columns 1 and 4), a
spatial autoregressive model (columns 2 and 5) and a model that combines the two by
considering both a spatial lag and a spatial error structure (columns 3 and 6).31
Spatial analysis is consistent with our baseline estimates. Interestingly, the co-
efficients on the spatial structure are almost always significant when using the row-
standardized contiguity matrix, suggesting that mafia’s activity in neighboring mu-
nicipalities is indeed relevant and thus spatial estimates are justified. Yet, the sign
of the spatial lag is not robust across specifications, so one should be cautious in its
interpretation. By contrast, the main result of the spatial analysis is that, across all
specifications, sulfur is always positively and significantly related to mafia density, with
a point estimated which is very close to the one estimated in table 2, column 6.
The above analysis controls for a great number of observed variables, as well as for
any unobserved variable that is common to all municipalities in a department. Yet,
in principle there is still the possibility that sulfur-rich municipalities differ from other
municipalities of the same department along some other unobserved characteristic, that
might be relevant for mafia’s emergence. This for instance might be the case if sul-
fur had always been a relevant source of rents, even in previous centuries. Although
we have already documented that sulfur exports were negligible at the beginning of
the XIX century, to indirectly test for this possibility we investigate whether sulfur
presence was correlated to population growth in the XVII and XVIII centuries.32 We
30We use column 6 rather than column 7 to avoid the reduction in sample size implied by missing
data for land fragmentation. Yet, results are robust to the inclusion of the latter variable.
31If neighboring units have similar intercepts due to their proximity, spatial dependence appears only
in the error term (LeSage and Pace, 2009) and a Spatial Error model (SEM) should be estimated. In
that case, omitting the spatial specification of the error term would reduce efficiency of the estimator,
while preserving consistency (Anselin, 1988). In turn, if mafia’s density in one municipality is directly
affected by mafia’s activity in neighboring locations, one should estimate a Spatial Autoregressive
model (SAR), which includes among regressors a spatial lag, that is, a weighted average of mafia’s
activity in neighboring municipalities. A (non-standardized) contiguity is a proximity matrix that
associates 1 to each pair of municipalities sharing a border and 0 to any other pair (the diagonal is
set to 0 by convention). Row-standardization is obtained by normalizing the sum of each row of the
matrix to 1. The difference between the first and the second case is that the spatial lag captures total
and average mafia’s activity in neighboring municipalities, respectively.
32Under the assumption that Sicily was on a Malthusian development path before the XIX century,
if sulfur was a relevant source of rents, this should translate in higher rates of population growth
where it was present.
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focus on those Sicilian municipalities for which we have data for years between 1600
and 1800 (a period characterized by Malthusian regime in which development is prox-
ied by population growth) and construct long term yearly population growth rates.33
Different specifications of a growth regression that have sulfur (and log of initial pop-
ulation to control for convergence) as controls show that sulfur had no economic role
in the economic development of Sicilian municipalities before the beginning of the XIX
century. Results are reported in table 5.
5.2 District-level estimates
In our baseline regressions we used our preferred measure of mafia intensity, maf c,
which is available at the municipality level. In order to obtain estimates directly
comparable with other studies (Bandiera, 2003; Pazzona, 2010; Dimico et al., 2012),
we employ the mafia measure as defined in the Damiani-Jacini parliamentary inquiry,
maf d, which is only available at district level, for 158 Sicilian districts.
We replicate the analysis proposed in our baseline regression presented in table
2, with the same specification: regressing maf d on sulfur and the controls presented
and discussed in the previous sections. Since estimates exploit district-level informa-
tion on mafia’s activity, we correspondingly re-define all our regressors at this level of
geographical and administrative aggregation. District-level findings are presented in
table 6. Throughout all the regressions, the estimated coefficient on sulfur is strongly
significant and is extremely stable, suggesting that our results are not driven by any
omitted variable.
As previously stated, the use of maf d is not only useful as a robustness check, but
it also allows a more direct comparison with earlier and subsequent contributions. In
particular, Bandiera (2003), who also uses district-level data, provides early evidence,
based on 70 districts located in the western part of Sicily, supporting the idea that
land fragmentation may have favored mafia’s emergence; while on the contrary Pazzona
(2010) provides evidence that the origins of the Sicilian mafia are rooted in the presence
of large landholdings. Our results, both those based on all the 158 available districts,
as well as those presented in Table 2, based on 237 municipalities, do not support their
arguments.
33Data for population of Italian towns between 1300 and 1861 are available from Paolo Malanima
at: http://www.paolomalanima.it/DEFAULT files/Page646.htm
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5.3 Neighbor-pair fixed effects
So far we have presented consistent and robust findings, documenting the significant
effect of the presence of sulfur on mafia’s origins. Since sulfur is not randomly dis-
tributed across Sicily, but rather geographically concentrated, we have relied on de-
partment fixed effects and on municipality-level controls to make sure that differences
in sulfur endowment do not pick up the effects of some other characteristics, which may
be relevant for mafia’s emergence. In this section we go even deeper and, rather than
comparing municipalities with different sulfur endowments within a given department,
we follow Acemoglu et al. (2012) and exploit variations in sulfur endowments across
direct neighbors.
In particular, we restrict our analysis to the 48 municipalities which have sulfur
mines and the 54 municipalities without sulfur mines which are adjacent to them.34 As
in Acemoglu et al. (2012), we implement the neighbor-pair fixed effects estimator, very
similar to a matching methodology and to a regression discontinuity design, comparing
each sulfur-mining municipality to each of its neighbors. Figure 5 visually presents
municipalities with sulfur mines and their neighbors.
This empirical strategy makes it possible to directly control for unobservables that
are common across adjacent municipalities by including neighbor-pair fixed effects. In-
deed, we rely on the assumption that adjacent municipalities faced similar institutional
and contextual conditions (i.e. law enforcement, state presence, culture, labor market,
geography), and are likely to be very similar across any other unobservables. Within
the neighbor pair, we claim that the exogenous source of variation in mafia’s activity
is the presence of sulfur mines.
Formally (see Acemoglu et al. (2012) for a more complete description), we define
with S the subset of municipalities with sulfur mines and with N(s) all the adjacent
municipalities without sulfur mines of each element of S. We use s and i to index
municipalities with and without sulfur mines, respectively. We estimate the following
model by means of OLS:
maf cs = βsulfurs + γX
′
s + ψsi + νs s ∈ S (1)
maf ci = βsulfuri + γX
′
i + ψsi + νi i ∈ N(s) (2)
where X ′t collects municipality-level controls, ψsi represents common unobservables for
34Note that although 48 municipalities have sulfur mines, 13 of them have as only neighbors other
municipalities with sulfur, so they cannot be exploited in this analysis.
23
Figure 5: Municipalities with sulfur mines and their neighbors
Note: White municipalities are excluded from the analysis because both them and their
neighbors do not host sulfur. Light grey municipalities are those 54 without sulfur that
have neighboring municipalities with sulfur (the 35 in dark grey). Black municipalities
are excluded because, even if endowed with sulfur, they do not neighbor any non-sulfur
municipality.
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the neighbor pair (s,i) and νt represents municipality-specific unobservables. Neighbor-
pair fixed effects estimates are presented in table 7. For simplicity we only present the
coefficient on sulfur, but consistently with table 2 we progressively add all the controls
described in the previous section. The coefficient of sulfur in the neighbor-pair fixed
effects estimates is always significant and its magnitude is very close to our baseline
findings, providing additional and compelling evidence on the role played by sulfur
endowment in mafia’s emergence.
5.4 Citrus cultivation
Here we further explore whether the hypothesis, often carried on in the literature
that there is a strong connection between cultivation of citrus fruit and the Sicilian
mafia, is supported by empirical evidence. In most of the specifications previously
presented, to which we refer to, we included an exogenous measure of land suitability
for citrus cultivation from GAEZ (discussed above). This variable never appeared to be
significant.35 In order to differently address the issue related to the role of citrus we now
include, among the controls, a transformation of the share of cultivable land cultivated
with citrus fruits as reported by Damiani (1885).36 In particular, given the skewed
distribution of this variable, we define 5 different dummies equal to 1 whether the share
of citrus crops in a municipality is respectively higher than 0, higher than 1%, higher
than 5%, higher than 10% and higher than the mean of all municipalities.37 Table
8 presents results that include, among the regressors, the citrus dummies previously
defined. The first five columns uses data at municipality level and therefore our main
dependent variable maf c. None of the dummies flagging those municipalities with high
incidence of citrus cultivation turns positive and significant, suggesting that, if any,
everything has already been controlled for the exogenous drivers of citrus cultivation.38
35As already reported, Cancila (1995) stresses that citrus fruits were mainly cultivated in the eastern
part of Sicily (in the provinces of Catania and Messina), while those cultivated in the Conca d’Oro
around Palermo were mainly for the local market.
36Dimico et al. (2012) use a dummy equals to one whether citrus is the dominant crop in the
department, while Del Monte and Pennacchio (2012) use as citrus intensity a 1 to 3 scale of undefined
productivity subjectively attributed from Cutrera (1900) to the 24 Sicilian departments. It is worth to
stress that Dimico et al. (2012) do not include data for the municipalities belonging to the province of
Caltanissetta, despite data on Caltanissetta are available in the anastatic reprints of the five volumes
of the Damiani (1885) inquiry cited above.
37More than 55% of Sicilian municipalities did not have crops cultivated with citrus fruits, while
the share of land cultivated with citrus fruits was more than 10% and 20% in the 12% and 5% of the
Sicilian municipalities, respectively.
38We also replicate the same estimates excluding citrus suitability from the set of controls, however
estimates remain unchanged.
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It is in fact true that the share of citrus cultivation can be highly endogenous and
therefore a causal effect difficult to be identified.39 Replicating the analysis using
district-level data and maf d as dependent variable does not change the results, i.e.
none of the dummies for citrus cultivation are significant.
5.5 Mafia’s persistence
Although the main purpose of our research is to shed light on the historical determi-
nants of the emergence of the mafia, we are also interested in understanding to what
extent these factors have had persistent effect on the presence of the mafia today. In
particular, we analyze whether the incidence of mafia activities today is correlated with
the presence of the mafia in the early stages of its development. In order to pursue our
goal we measure today mafia intensity by means of several variables available at the
municipality level: (i) dissolution of municipal administration due to mafia infiltrations;
(ii) seized firms and (iii) seized real estate properties. We define a dummy that takes
value one whether the municipality council dissolved due to mafia infiltration over the
period 1991 to 2011 (source: Ministero dell’Interno) and two dummies equal to one
respectively whether at least a firm and at least a real estate/property have been seized
by the Italian judicial authority in the municipality at the end of 2011 (source: Agen-
zia del Demanio).40 It is worth to notice that over the considered period more than
10% of Sicilian municipalities were dissolved and firms and real estate properties were
seized respectively in more than 23% and 44% of Sicilian municipalities. Morevoer, we
also consider non-mafia related crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants at the municipality
level as a falsification test (source: Polizia di Stato, Ministero dell’Interno). Indeed,
we should expect that given the strict territorial control exerted by the Sicilian mafia,
property crime should be unaffected or even lowered in municipalities with a stronger
presence of mafia. We propose a simple instrumental variable approach in which the
first stage is specification presented in column 2 of table 2 (i.e. maf c regressed on
sulfur and department fixed effects) and the second stage is a measure of crime today
on the instrumented measure of historical mafia (i.e., maf c). Instrumental variable es-
timates, presented in table 9 show a strong effect of early mafia on the actual presence
of mafia, confirming the persistence of the phenomenon over time. Moreover, petty
39Dimico et al. (2012) instrument their variable on citrus prevalence with altitude. As we widely
described altitude and ruggedness may exert a direct effect on mafia emergence. Thus, altitude does
not satisfy the exclusion restriction.
40Law n. 221 (July 1991) sets the rule for council dissolution due to mafia infiltration. Law n.
646 (September 1982), known as Law“Rognoni - La Torre” rules the seizure of firms and real estate
properties belonging to mafia-like organizations.
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crime rates (i.e., theft, burglary, car theft and robbery) are in some cases negatively
affected by the presence of the mafia in the early stages of its development, suggesting
that the territorial and social control of mafia acts as a deterrent to non-mafia related
crimes.
6 Conclusions
We presented a general framework useful to interpret the emergence of mafia-type
organizations as a combination of weak state and the presence of valuable natural
resources. We have applied this framework to the case of the emergence of the Sicilian
mafia, occurred during the XIX century, arguing that the demise of Sicilian feudalism
and of Bourbon Kingdom generated a widespread power vacuum that triggered the
development of a large potential supply of private protection. At the same time, in
those areas characterized by the extraction and commercialization of sulfur, whose
international demand was soaring, the demand for private protection boomed. We
collected a new dataset with detailed information on mafia activity and presence of
sulfur mines at the municipality level and we indeed found a strong causal effect of
the presence of sulfur, proxied by the number of mines, on mafia activity. We claim
the effect of sulfur on mafia activity to be causal, or its lower bound estimate, since
sulfur is exogenously distributed as any natural resource, it is easily discoverable in
Sicily since it is mainly superficial and until the beginning of XIX it was commercially
barely useless. Our findings are robust when using data at a lower level of aggregation
and using another, less reliable measure of mafia activity. Also, allowing for a spatial
structure of both the level of mafia and the errors leads to the same results. Lastly,
restricting the analysis only to pairs of adjacent municipalities with and without sulfur
mines, in a RDD fashion, does not change the main message.
On top of finding a fundamental result on the causal link running from sulfur to
mafia, our work also reviews and tests previous findings on the causes of the emergence
of Sicilian mafia. In general none of the usual suspects for the emergence of mafia
are empirically relevant, in particular once we control for fixed effects at the level of
the 24 districts, the judicial and administrative divisions at which law enforcement was
organized. Specifically, we do not find neither an historical nor an empirical support for
the claim, proposed by old and recent literature, that the presence of citrus cultivation
should causally provoke the emergence of mafia.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
maf c 282 1.433 1.140 0 3
maf d 158 .689 1.064 0 3
Sulfur 282 1.986 7.099 0 61
Sulfur dummy 282 .167 .373 0 1
Citrus suitability 282 15.608 7.658 0 48
Cereals suitability 282 17.728 11.149 1.490 66.380
Olive suitability 282 30.906 12.065 3.478 69.273
Water scarcity 282 0.702 0.458 0 1
Ruggedness 282 433.630 195.940 58.017 1,149.332
Diff. elevation 282 796.837 519.126 48 3,232
Postal roads 282 0.550 0.498 0 1
River distance 282 9.279 7.247 .992 42.075
Port distance 282 37.924 19.371 0.132 83.919
Urban 282 0.124 0.330 0 1
Density 282 132.412 126.861 4.856 1,177.986
Fragmentation 237 0.759 0.428 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. Data is at the
municipality level except for maf d that is collected at the district level.
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Table 2: Baseline estimates
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur .0329∗∗∗ .0224∗∗∗ .0237∗∗∗ .0228∗∗ .0234∗∗ .0239∗∗∗ .0549∗∗∗
(.0105) (.0082) (.0089) (.0091) (.0092) (.0089) (.0127)
Citrus suitabiliy -.0251∗ -.0155 -.0235 -.0227 -.0293
(.0150) (.0151) (.0163) (.0166) (.0180)
Cereals suitabiliy .0235∗∗ .0223∗∗ .0224∗∗ .0224∗∗ .0296∗∗∗
(.0108) (.0108) (.0107) (.0110) (.0111)
Olive suitabiliy -.0037 -.0039 .0009 -.0016 -.0001
(.0119) (.0119) (.0131) (.0129) (.0145)
Water scarcity .1267 -.0460 -.0231 .0057 -.0548
(.1986) (.1990) (.1923) (.1933) (.2010)
Ruggedness -.0011 -.0010 -.0011 -.0006
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
Diff. elevation .0004∗∗∗ .0004∗∗∗ .0005∗∗∗ .0006∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
Postal roads .0811 .0975 .1470
(.1008) (.1002) (.1127)
River distance .0101 .0045 .0091
(.0092) (.0094) (.0101)
Port distance -.0087 -.0034 -.0022
(.0060) (.0069) (.0080)
Urban .1855 .0925
(.1898) (.2133)
Density .0013∗∗∗ .0012∗∗
(.0005) (.0005)
Fragmentation .0961
(.1315)
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 237
R2 0.042 0.567 0.577 0.594 0.601 0.618 0.659
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which values for all the
variables are available. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia activity at the end of XIX century
as coded by Cutrera (1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main
explanatory variable Sulfur is the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the other
control variables are described in the main text. Department fixed effects are included in all specifications
except the first. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null
hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 3: Baseline with sulfur dummy
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur dummy .5532∗∗∗ .3594∗ .4501∗∗ .3968∗ .4165∗ .4916∗∗ .4550∗∗
(.1765) (.2193) (.2286) (.2370) (.2449) (.2237) (.2168)
Controls
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Suitability and water N N Y Y Y Y Y
Geomorphological N N N Y Y Y Y
Distances N N N N Y Y Y
Sociodemographic N N N N N Y Y
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 237
R2 0.033 0.559 0.570 0.587 0.593 0.613 0.639
Note: Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities, for which values for
all the variables are available. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia activity at the end of XIX
century as coded by Cutrera (1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main
explanatory variable, Sulfur dummy, is a dummy taking value one if the number of sulfur mines as collected
by Squarzina (1963) is greater than zero, while the other control variables are described in the main text.
Department fixed effects are included in all specifications except the first. Robust standard errors are presented
in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%,
5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
35
Table 4: Spatial estimates
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sulfur .0229∗∗∗ .0234∗∗∗ .0227∗∗∗ .0211∗∗∗ .0234∗∗∗ .0231∗∗∗
(.0072) (.0071) (.0072) (.0071) (.0071) (.0066)
λ .0143 .0149 .4762∗∗∗ .6857∗∗∗
(.010) (.010) (.138) (.113)
ρ .0144 -.0038 0.0497 -0.6252∗∗∗
(.022) (.025) (.103) (.149)
Controls
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y
Suitability and water N N Y Y Y Y
Geomorphological N N N Y Y Y
Distances N N N N Y Y
Sociodemographic N N N N N Y
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282
Note: This table presents the results of a spatial model estimated by means of the generalized spatial two stage
least squares (GS2SLS) estimator of Kelejian and Prucha (1998). Included controls are the same as in the
specification of column 6 of table 2. Columns 1 to 3 employ a non-standardized contiguity matrix, while a row-
standardized one is used in columns 4 to 6. A Spatial Error model, a Spatial Autoregressive model and a model
that combines the two by considering both a spatial lag and a spatial error structure are respectively presented
in columns 1 and 4, columns 2 and 5 and columns 3 and 6. λ is the spatial error term, while ρ is the spatial
lag. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia activity at the end of XIX century as coded by Cutrera
(1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable, Sulfur,
is the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the other control variables are described
in the main text. Department fixed effects are included in all specifications except the first. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being
equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 5: Growth regressions
Dependent variable: population growth
1600-1700 1700-1800 1600-1800
(1) (2) (3)
ln(population 1600) -.1660∗∗∗ -.0900∗∗
(.0576) (.0404)
ln(population 1700) -.0761
(.0608)
Sulfur .0003 -.0002 -.0002
(.0030) (.0028) (.0022)
Obs. 47 56 50
R2 .159 .029 .097
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which popula-
tion was positive in at least two of the years 1600, 1700 or 1800, according to Malanima’s data
(http://www.paolomalanima.it/DEFAULT files/Page646.htm). The dependent variable is the yearly popu-
lation growth while the explanatory variables are the log of population at the beginning of the period and
Sulfur, the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963). Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5%
and 1% significance level, respectively.
37
Table 6: District level estimates
Dependent variable: maf d
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur .0354∗∗∗ .0318∗∗∗ .0325∗∗∗ .0327∗∗∗ .0326∗∗∗ .0347∗∗∗ .0322∗∗
(.0080) (.0115) (.0116) (.0117) (.0121) (.0122) (.0127)
Citrus suitability .0413 .0483 .0444 .0399 .0378
(.0315) (.0324) (.0344) (.0351) (.0352)
Cereals suitability -.0034 .0024 .0022 .0042 .0016
(.0193) (.0188) (.0196) (.0197) (.0201)
Olive suitability -.0203 -.0203 -.0212 -.0207 -.0155
(.0180) (.0177) (.0198) (.0199) (.0210)
Water scarcity .2763∗ .2842 .2669 .2365 .2078
(.1678) (.1730) (.1711) (.1720) (.1820)
Ruggedness .0010 .0013 .0009 .0007
(.0002) (0.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Diff. elevation .0002 .0002 .0003 .0003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Postal roads .2210 .2877 .2680
(.1906) (.1947) (.1993)
River distance .0026 -.0022 -.0040
(.0177) (.0182) (.0184)
Port distance -.0009 .0016 .0002
(.0126) (.0145) (.0144)
Urban -.1216 -.1115
(.4075) (.4097)
Density .0014∗ .0014∗
(.0008) (.0008)
Fragmentation -.1847
(.2467)
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 158 158 158 158 158 158 158
R2 0.105 0.232 0.249 0.259 0.266 0.283 0.288
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian districts for which values for all the variables
are included. The dependent variable is maf d, the level of mafia activity around 1883 as coded by Damiani
(1885) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable Sulfur
is the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the other control variables are described
in the main text. Department fixed effects are included in all specifications except the first. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being
equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 7: Neighbor pair fixed effect estimates
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sulfur .0206∗∗∗ .0172∗∗ .0231∗∗ .0216∗∗ .0196∗∗ .0207∗∗∗
(.0061) (.0073) (.0093) (.0094) (.0094) (.0055)
Controls
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y
Suitability and water N N Y Y Y Y
Geomorphological N N N Y Y Y
Distances N N N N Y Y
Sociodemographic N N N N N Y
Obs. 162 162 162 162 162 162
R2 0.054 0.637 0.667 0.672 0.681 0.795
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which values for all the
variables are available. Observations are all those municipalities that form a couple in which a municipality has
sulfur and its neighbor has not. Each municipality in a pair shares a common pair fixed effect. The dependent
variable is maf c, the level of mafia activity at the end of XIX century as coded by Cutrera (1900) on a 0 to
3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable Sulfur is the number
of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the other control variables are described in the main
text. Pair fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
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Table 9: Persistence
Council Real estates Firms Theft Burglary Car theft Robbery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
maf c .0706∗∗∗ .1477∗∗∗ .1524∗∗∗ -183.9049∗∗∗ 3.1591 -28.3848∗∗∗ -2.2930
(.0187) (.0325) (.0277) (52.9439) (10.1428) (9.4874) (2.0695)
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 282
Note: This table present the result of instrumental variable estimates in which the first stage is specification
presented in column 2 of table 2 (i.e. maf c regressed on sulfur and department fixed effects) and the second
stage is a measure of crime today on the instrumented measure of historical mafia (i.e., maf c). Today mafia
presence is measured by: (i) dissolution of municipal administration due to mafia infiltrations; (ii) seized firms
and (iii) seized real estate properties. Council is a dummy that takes value one whether the municipality council
dissolved due to mafia infiltration over the period 1991 to 2011 (source: Ministero dell’Interno), Real estates is
a dummy equals to one whether at least a real estate property has been seized by the Italian judicial authority
and Firms is a dummy equals to 1 whether at least a firm has been seized (source: Agenzia del Demanio).
Theft, Burglary, Car theft and Robbery are crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants for each Sicilian municipality
(source: Polizia di Stato, Ministero dell’Interno). Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **
and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance
level, respectively.
41
 
